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THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN DEPARTMENT 
OF VETERANS AFFAIRS DISABILITY 
COMPENSATION POLICIES FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL 
ILLNESSES AND INJURIES 
Mark Brown, Ph.D.∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has responded 
to the healthcare and disability compensation needs of veterans of 
the Vietnam War for more than three decades. Ongoing concerns 
by veterans, their families, Congress and others have made long-
term health effects from exposure to Agent Orange and other 
herbicides used in the Vietnam War a major focus of the VA’s 
response. 
Part I of this article will provide an overview of the VA’s 
mandate with respect to the provision of federal benefits to 
veterans and their families. This section also will discuss the 
requirements that veterans applying for such benefits must meet 
and the difficulties veterans face when their claims are based on 
latent illnesses arising from hazardous exposures that occurred 
years before. Part II will describe the VA’s approach to disability 
compensation for Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange as 
well as the VA’s more recent attempts to duplicate that approach 
                                                          
 ∗ Mark Brown, Ph.D., is the Director of the Environmental Agents Service 
of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. This paper was presented to the 
fourth program on Science for Judges, held at Brooklyn Law School on 
November 4, 2004. The author would like to acknowledge Mr. David Barrans, 
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, for his help in reviewing this manuscript 
and for explaining legal citations. 
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for veterans from other combat missions, including the 1991 Gulf 
War. This article concludes that, despite some unanticipated 
consequences, the VA’s approach to Agent Orange has worked 
well for establishing scientifically based and politically acceptable 
compensation policies for Vietnam veterans. Efforts to apply this 
approach to other groups of combat veterans with possible 
environmental and occupational injuries and illnesses, however, 
have not been successful. 
I. PROVIDING DISABILITY COMPENSATION FOR VETERANS 
The VA is responsible for providing a wide range of federal 
benefits, including healthcare, disability compensation, education 
and vocational training, home loans, pensions, rehabilitation, and 
survivor and burial benefits, to nearly 26 million American 
veterans and their families.1 The provision of this wide range of 
services has made the VA the second largest of all Cabinet-level 
departments in terms of budget and staff. The VA’s fiscal year 
2004 spending was $62.1 billion—$29.1 billion for healthcare and 
$32.4 billion for benefits, including disability compensation.2 The 
VA’s national healthcare system includes 158 hospitals, with at 
least one in each of the forty-eight contiguous states, Puerto Rico, 
and the District of Columbia. In fiscal year 2003, the VA provided 
healthcare to about 4.8 million veterans, who made more than 49.8 
million outpatient clinic visits.3 
The VA’s disability compensation program provides monthly 
monetary benefits to veterans who are disabled by service-
connected injuries or diseases, that is, for illnesses or injuries that 
were incurred or aggravated during their active military service.4 
The amount of a monthly disability check is established by 
Congress and is based on the degree of the service-connected 
disability in 10% increments (10%, 20%, etc.), as determined by a 
                                                          
1 Office of Public Affairs Media Relations, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 
Facts about the Department of Veterans Affairs (Feb. 2005), available at 
http://www.va.gov/OPA/fact/docs/vafacts.pdf. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
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VA disability rating specialist.5 Currently, a veteran with a 10% 
service-connected disability receives $108 per month, while a 
veteran with a 100% service-connected disability receives $2,299 
monthly.6 In fiscal year 2003, the VA spent $26 billion providing 
disability compensation, death compensation, and pensions to 
about 3.4 million veterans, and to nearly 600,000 spouses, 
children, and parents of deceased veterans.7 
A. Direct Service Connection and Disability Compensation 
Establishing service connection and degree of disability usually 
requires a simple review for a veteran with an acute disease or 
injury, for example, a bullet or shrapnel wound.8 Most veterans 
receiving disability compensation from the VA have injuries that 
may be assessed through such a direct service connection 
approach. Establishing direct service connection can be more 
contentious, however, when the illness or injury involves a chronic 
disease possibly caused by an environmental or occupational 
exposure that may have occurred decades in the past (for example, 
exposure to benzene as a potential cause of leukemia). 
1. The Legal Standard 
Congress has provided the VA with statutory guidance for 
evaluating a direct disability compensation claim. Pursuant to 
statute, the VA is authorized to pay disability compensation only 
for a “disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease 
contracted in line of duty, or for aggravation of a preexisting injury 
suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, in the active military, 
                                                          
5 U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR VETERANS 
AND DEPENDENTS 73 (2005), available at http://www.vetwatchnw.com/Fedben. 
pdf. 
6 Id. at 73. 
7 Office of Public Affairs Media Relations, supra note 1. 
8 Compensation and Pension Service, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 
Disability Compensation Benefits (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.vba. 
va.gov/bln/21/Milsvc/Docs/Compeg.doc. 
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naval, or air service.”9 
The required showing that a disease was incurred in service can 
present significant difficulties in cases involving latent diseases 
allegedly associated with exposures many years earlier. Courts 
have held that claimants must establish a causal “nexus” between 
their current diseases and some incident or exposure during 
military service.10 The VA has, however, adopted a relatively 
generous approach to resolving factual issues pertinent to this 
inquiry. A VA regulation, 38 C.F.R. section 3.102, establishes 
what is known as the “reasonable doubt” or “benefit of the doubt” 
doctrine, which also has been referred to as the “tie goes to the 
runner” rule based upon the baseball analogy. In relevant part, the 
regulation provides: 
It is the defined and consistently applied policy of the 
Department of Veterans Affairs to administer the law under 
a broad interpretation, consistent, however, with the facts 
shown in every case. When, after careful consideration of 
all procurable and assembled data, a reasonable doubt 
arises regarding service origin, the degree of disability, or 
any other point, such doubt will be resolved in favor of the 
claimant. By reasonable doubt is meant one which exists 
because of an approximate balance of positive and negative 
evidence which does not satisfactorily prove or disprove 
the claim. . . . The reasonable doubt doctrine is also 
applicable even in the absence of official records, 
particularly if the basic incident allegedly arose under 
combat, or similarly strenuous conditions, and is consistent 
                                                          
9 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2005). 
10 Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166-67 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[I]n 
order to establish service connection . . . the veteran must show: (1) the 
existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a 
disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and 
the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service.”); McCartt v. West, 
12 Vet. App. 164, 168 (1999) (holding that, in the absence of an applicable 
presumption of service connection, a claimant alleging disability due to Agent 
Orange exposure had to submit “medical evidence of a nexus between Agent 
Orange exposure and the appellant’s current [disease]”). 
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with the probable results of such known hardships.11 
In other words, the VA adjudicates a veteran’s direct service 
disability compensation claim based upon the merits of the 
individual case and grants a claim when the VA determines that a 
veteran’s illness or injury is at least as likely as not to have been 
caused by the environmental or occupational exposure. 
2. Four Key Categories of Evidence for Direct Service Connection 
 As a practical matter, establishing a “nexus” between a 
current disease and a claimed environmental or occupational 
exposure in service generally requires four key categories of 
evidence: 
1. Evidence of a Scientific Association. Veterans must show 
credible scientific or medical evidence that the exposure 
involved is accepted as being associated with their specific 
illness or injury; 
2. Evidence of Military Exposure. Veterans must show 
evidence that the relevant environmental or occupational 
exposure occurred during their active military duty; 
3. Evidence of Temporal Plausibility. Veterans must show 
that their illnesses or injuries were initiated or were 
exacerbated during active military duty; and 
4. Evidence of Exposure Magnitude. Veterans must show 
evidence of an unusually large or prolonged exposure to 
support the conclusion that the exposure was at least as 
likely as not to have been the specific cause of their 
illnesses or injuries, in comparison to all other potential 
causes of those illnesses experienced before and after 
military service. 
The “Evidence of Exposure Magnitude” requirement means 
that a minimal, short-term, or commonplace exposure to an 
environmental hazard might support the possibility that an illness 
or injury was caused by the exposure; however, it might fail to 
cross the statutory threshold requiring that it be at least as likely as 
                                                          
11 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2005). 
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not to have been the cause when compared to all other possible 
causes. For example, a veteran who served two years in the 
military and was diagnosed with leukemia at age fifty may have 
had forty-eight years of exposure to benzene (a component of 
gasoline) as a civilian outside of his military service and only two 
years of exposure during service. Evidence that might support an 
unusually large benzene exposure could include documentation 
that the veteran’s military occupation, for example, regular motor 
vehicle maintenance duties, specifically involved contact with 
benzene. 
In practice, this point can represent a significant hurdle for 
establishing direct service connection for an illness or injury 
caused by an environmental or occupational exposure. For 
example, benzene is only a single and probably relatively minor 
cause of all leukemias, and leukemia from all causes is not an 
uncommon disease. Further, virtually everyone experiences 
constant, minor benzene exposure because benzene is a component 
of gasoline and other common solvents. Despite these restrictions, 
most disability claims for environmental or occupational injury or 
illness are based upon this direct service connection approach. 
B. An Alternate Route to Disability Compensation: 
Presumptive Service Connection 
The VA has the authority to bypass one or even all of the four 
key categories of evidence required for a direct service claim by 
establishing a “presumptive” or automatic service connection. For 
example, 38 C.F.R. section 3.307 and 38 C.F.R. section 3.309 list 
some relatively common chronic diseases, including arthritis, 
leukemia, and Type II diabetes, that the VA can presume to be 
service connected when they appear within a certain period after 
separation from military service, even if available evidence is not 
sufficient to support a direct service connection. These 
presumptively service connected illnesses must lead to at least 
10% disability and appear generally within one year from the date 
of the claimant’s separation from military service.12 Similarly, in 
                                                          
12 38 C.F.R. § 3.307 (2005); 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 (2005). 
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1995, Congress authorized the VA’s compensation of veterans 
with undiagnosed illnesses or with difficult to diagnose illnesses, 
such as chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, and irritable 
bowel syndrome, that are defined by a cluster of signs or 
symptoms.13 Under 38 U.S.C. section 1117, the VA is empowered 
to provide compensation to Gulf War veterans who, for at least six 
months, exhibit objective evidence of 10% or greater disability, 
which may include disability due to fatigue, skin conditions, 
headache, muscle and joint pain, sleep disturbances, abnormal 
weight loss, menstrual disorders, and neurologic or 
neuropsychological, respiratory, gastrointestinal, and 
cardiovascular illnesses.14 Approximately 3,200 veterans of the 
1991 Gulf War have received compensation based upon this law. 
These statutes give veterans the benefit of the doubt in cases in 
which certain poorly understood illnesses manifest within a 
defined period. Further, they effectively eliminate at least the 
“Evidence of Temporal Plausibility” requirement of the direct 
service connection test. Presumptive service connection for the 
specified diseases is not, however, automatic, and the VA may 
consider evidence in rebuttal of service connection, including “any 
evidence of a nature usually accepted as competent to indicate the 
time of existence or inception of disease . . . .”15 In fact, the VA’s 
statutorily defined Agent Orange Vietnam Veteran compensation 
policies, described in Part II of this article, have eliminated 
essentially all four key categories. Not surprisingly, this has also 
produced certain unexpected problems. 
II. BACKGROUND ON THE VA’S PRESUMPTIVE SERVICE 
CONNECTION FOR AGENT ORANGE 
Vietnam veterans during the 1960s and 1970s voiced 
increasing concerns about how exposure to herbicides and dioxin 
had affected their health. Some veterans cited Agent Orange as the 
source of various health problems that extended to birth defects 
                                                          
13 38 U.S.C. § 1117. 
14 Id. 
15 38 C.F.R. § 3.307 (2005); 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 (2005). 
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among their children. Initially, the VA had problems establishing 
policies on Agent Orange disability compensation. Minimal 
veteran exposure information and limited scientific understanding 
of Agent Orange and dioxin health effects meant that in the face of 
mounting concerns from veterans and others, essentially all four 
necessary categories of evidence for direct service connection were 
missing. 
In response, in 1991, Congress passed Public Law 102-4, more 
commonly known as the “Agent Orange Act.” The Act mandated a 
new process for establishing presumptive service connections for 
illnesses related to Vietnam veterans’ exposure to Agent Orange, 
other herbicides, and the contaminant dioxin, including a 
presumption of exposure to those agents.16 The new law 
represented a significant breakthrough for establishing 
compensation policies in this area for what remains a controversial 
issue even today. 
The Agent Orange Act directed the VA to contract with the 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct a comprehensive 
review of all scientific and medical literature on the health effects 
from exposure to Agent Orange and other herbicides used in 
Vietnam, and to dioxin. The initial 1994 NAS report—an 
exhaustive and thorough review of all published literature on 
health effects from exposure to these agents—established the 
pattern for all future reports. Most of the reviewed literature came 
from studies of civilians exposed either through industrial 
accidents or in the workplace rather than from veterans themselves. 
A. NAS Science and VA Policy 
The Agent Orange Act assigns the NAS the responsibility of 
evaluating the relevant science.17 The VA, in turn, is given 
responsibility for translating the NAS’s scientific conclusions into 
                                                          
16 Agent Orange Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-4, 105 Stat. 11 (1991) 
(codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 1116). 
17 38 U.S.C. § 1116 note (stating that the Act authorizes the National 
Academy of Sciences “to review and evaluate the available scientific evidence 
regarding associations between diseases and exposure to dioxin and other 
chemical compounds in herbicides”). 
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veteran compensation policy.18 In other words, the statute 
expressly invites the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to consider 
evidence in addition to that provided by the NAS. In practice, the 
VA assembles an internal taskforce of scientists, medical doctors, 
attorneys, and compensation experts to evaluate and recommend 
possible policy options to the Secretary in response to an NAS 
report. 
The Act further provides for an automatic “Evidence of a 
Scientific Association” for all Vietnam veterans, stating that “[a]n 
association between the occurrence of a disease in humans and 
exposure to an herbicide agent shall be considered to be positive 
for the purposes of this section if the credible evidence for the 
association is equal to or outweighs the credible evidence against 
the association.”19 Based on the 1994 NAS report, the VA decided 
to presumptively recognize a range of illnesses, including soft 
tissue sarcoma, non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, Hodgkin’s disease, 
chloracne, porphyria cutanea tarda, multiple myeloma, and 
respiratory cancers. The Agent Orange Act also requires the NAS 
to update its reviews based on new science at least every two 
years.20 Updated reviews, published in 1996, 1998, 2000, and 
2002, have expanded the VA’s list of presumptively service-
                                                          
18 38 U.S.C. § 1116(b)(1)-(2). In relevant part, the statute states: 
Whenever the Secretary determines, on the basis of sound medical and 
scientific evidence, that a positive association exists between (A) the 
exposure of humans to an herbicide agent, and (B) the occurrence of a 
disease in humans, the Secretary shall prescribe regulations providing 
that a presumption of service connection is warranted for that disease 
for the purposes of this section. In making determinations for the 
purpose of this subsection, the Secretary shall take into account (A) 
reports received by the Secretary from the National Academy of 
Sciences under section 3 of the Agent Orange Act of 1991, and (B) all 
other sound medical and scientific information and analyses available 
to the Secretary. In evaluating any study for the purpose of making 
such determinations, the Secretary shall take into consideration whether 
the results are statistically significant, are capable of replication, and 
withstand peer review. 
Id. 
19 38 U.S.C. § 1116(b)(3). 
20 Id. § 1116 note. 
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connected illnesses to include acute or sub-acute peripheral 
neuropathy, Type II diabetes, prostate cancer, and most recently, 
chronic lymphocytic leukemia. Based upon the 1996 NAS update 
and congressional action, Vietnam veterans’ children with spina 
bifida are also eligible for certain compensation and other 
services.21 
The Act also prescribes a “presumption of exposure” that 
effectively frees a Vietnam veteran from having to show 
“Evidence of Military Exposure,” “Evidence of Temporal 
Plausibility,” and “Evidence of Exposure Magnitude,” the second, 
third, and fourth key categories of evidence required for 
establishing a direct service connection.22 As a result of this 
statutorily defined policy, an eligible veteran (i.e., a veteran with 
any discharge other than dishonorable discharge) must only show 
that he is a Vietnam veteran diagnosed with one of the diseases 
presumptively recognized as service connected to herbicide 
exposure. Once this showing is made, service connection becomes 
automatic. 
This process eliminates a significant burden for Vietnam 
veterans trying to establish service connection and disability 
compensation for illnesses related to herbicide exposure. However, 
there have been unexpected consequences in terms of apparent 
inequities and unanticipated costs. 
                                                          
21 38 C.F.R. § 3.814 (2005). 
22 38 U.S.C. § 1116. Specifically, the statute provides: 
For purposes of establishing service connection for a disability or death 
resulting from exposure to a herbicide agent, including a presumption 
of service-connection under this section, a veteran who, during active 
military, naval, or air service, served in the Republic of Vietnam during 
the period beginning on January 9, 1962, and ending on May 7, 1975, 
shall be presumed to have been exposed during such service to an 
herbicide agent containing dioxin or 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid, 
and may be presumed to have been exposed during such service to any 
other chemical compound in an herbicide agent, unless there is 
affirmative evidence to establish that the veteran was not exposed to 
any such agent during that service. 
Id. § 1116(f) (2005). 
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1. Credibility and Independence 
The strengths of the NAS scientific review process are its 
breadth and thoroughness, and the NAS’s reputation for 
independence and scientific prestige. Earlier efforts by the VA to 
conduct its own scientific reviews on herbicide health effects were 
viewed by many veterans as lacking credibility and 
independence.23 Although veterans have not always been happy 
with the NAS findings, the NAS’s credibility has remained intact. 
Indeed, the NAS process has become an essential step in ensuring 
that new service connection presumptions command scientific 
credibility. 
2. Compensation Inequities 
Without statutorily defined presumptions, Vietnam veterans 
would have difficulty establishing a direct service connection for 
any illnesses related to herbicide or dioxin exposure. In particular, 
it would be difficult for claimants to provide “Evidence of a 
Scientific Association,” “Evidence of Military Exposure,” and 
“Evidence of Temporal Plausibility.” Epidemiological studies of 
Vietnam veterans suggest that herbicide and dioxin exposure play, 
probably at most, only a minute role in overall mortality.24 Taken 
together, these studies suggest that Vietnam veterans would have 
pronounced difficulty establishing “Evidence of Exposure 
Magnitude,” that is, evidence that their exposures were sufficiently 
                                                          
23 U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON 
HERBICIDES, INCLUDING PHENOXY HERBICIDES AND ASSOCIATED DIOXINS 
(1981-1992) (vols. 1 & 2 prepared by JRB Associates, McLean, Va.; vols. 3 to 
18 prepared by Clement Int’l, Fairfax, Va.; vols. 19 & 20 prepared by Info. 
Ventures, Phila., Pa.). 
24 Numerous epidemiological studies of Vietnam veterans in general do not 
show that this group has higher mortality or morbidity from most of the diseases 
presumptively connected to herbicide exposure. An excellent summary of 
mortality and morbidity research on Vietnam veterans compared to their non-
deployed peers is available in “Veterans and Agent Orange: A Continuing 
Medical Education Program,” an independent study course first published in 
2002 by the Department of Veterans Affairs, Employee Education System, 
available at www.va.gov/VHI/. 
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great or prolonged to make it at least as likely as not that the 
exposures were the cause of the veterans’ illnesses or injuries when 
compared to all other potential causes. A related problem is that 
the Agent Orange Act has created a narrow focus on herbicides as 
the key to Vietnam veterans’ illnesses when in fact they almost 
certainly play only a very minor role. 
Further, the Agent Orange Act applies only to Vietnam 
veterans. Non-Vietnam veterans exposed to herbicides and dioxins 
do not receive the benefit of presumptive service connections; 
however, many non-Vietnam veterans have been exposed to these 
agents, including U.S. troops serving during the Vietnam War but 
only in nearby countries, including Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, 
or off-shore aboard ships. The U.S. military during 1968 and 1969 
also used Agent Orange and similar herbicides to defoliate the 
demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. The military 
use of Agent Orange and related herbicides also was tested and 
developed at U.S. bases located in the United States and abroad. 
There is no obvious scientific or public health basis for 
excluding these non-Vietnam War veterans from the presumptive 
service connection offered to Vietnam veterans. Nevertheless, the 
Agent Orange Act does not reference these veterans. To partially 
address this apparent inequity, the VA has established the general 
policy that when a non-Vietnam veteran is diagnosed with one of 
the presumptively service-connected Agent Orange illnesses and 
the veteran can provide evidence of exposure to Agent Orange, 
then he can be granted service connection through a sort of 
modified direct service connection route. 
Even this approach may ultimately prove unmanageable 
because, in fact, the majority of veterans could in principle claim 
herbicide exposure during military service, and thus, service 
connection for related illnesses. From the 1950s to the early 1970s, 
Agent Orange and related herbicides, including those with dioxin 
contaminants, were extensively used domestically for weed control 
on lawns and golf courses (including those on military bases and 
even VA hospitals), in forestry, and for weed control along fences, 
borders, and roads. Thus, everyone living during that period likely 
would have had some exposure. 
Moreover, why should this policy be limited to military 
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personnel? Many domestic civilian workers used these same 
chemical agents. The VA has received inquiries about the VA’s 
Agent Orange compensation policies from employees of the U.S. 
Department of Interior who were involved in spraying these 
herbicides on U.S. forests during the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently asked the VA 
why these same policies should not be applied to workers’ 
compensation claims filed with the U.S. Department of Labor. 
Similarly, the Government of Vietnam has publicly insisted that 
the U.S. government provide compensation to Vietnamese 
civilians for Agent Orange-related injuries. (Thus far, the U.S. 
government has denied this request.) 
3. Cost Inequities 
The economic implications of the Agent Orange Act may not 
have been fully anticipated by Congress. In perhaps the most 
dramatic and expensive example, the 2000 NAS Agent Orange 
special report concluded that there was “limited/suggestive” 
evidence associating herbicide exposure and Type II diabetes.25 
(Previous NAS reports had not found such positive evidence, but 
new scientific studies finally tipped the balance.) After reviewing 
that finding, in 2001, the VA announced a new presumptive 
service connection for Type II diabetes among Vietnam veterans. 
This decision has significant economic implications. The VA 
estimated that about 9%, or about 270,000 of the approximately 3 
million Vietnam veterans, would have Type II diabetes based 
solely upon on their age and other demographics. Diabetes often 
involves prolonged disability, and treatment can be expensive. The 
VA estimated that disability and treatment would cost several 
billion dollars over the first five years of implementing this policy. 
This is a significant portion of the VA’s overall disability 
compensation budget for all veterans. 
In fact, epidemiological studies do not show Vietnam veterans 
                                                          
25 INST. OF MEDICINE, NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, VETERANS AND 
AGENT ORANGE: HERBICIDE/DIOXIN EXPOSURE AND TYPE 2 DIABETES 2 (2000) 
(Nat’l Academy Press, Wash., D.C.). 
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dying from Type II diabetes at greater rates than their non-
deployed peers. This suggests that there are probably only a small 
number of excess cases of Type II diabetes among Vietnam 
veterans due to herbicide or dioxin exposure during military 
service; indeed, the NAS noted that the biggest risk factors for 
diabetes are lifestyle and obesity. Coupled with limited exposure 
data, this means that few, if any, of these cases would have been 
granted service connection via the direct service connection route. 
In effect, the VA’s policy compensates a very large number of 
veterans who would have been diagnosed with Type II diabetes 
regardless of their military service in order to ensure coverage of 
the few veterans who may have contracted the disease because of 
it. 
B. Applying the NAS Process to Gulf War Veterans 
Despite these problems, the Agent Orange Act and the NAS 
process it defined are generally acknowledged as successful 
approaches to incorporating science into difficult and contentious 
veteran compensation policy decisions. Nevertheless, more recent 
attempts to apply the Agent Orange approach to emerging 
environmental disabilities in veterans have suffered from the 
unintended consequences associated with implementing the Agent 
Orange Act for Vietnam veterans and thus far have produced little 
or no benefit for veterans. 
The 1991 Gulf War concluded fourteen years ago. In response 
to the concerns of veterans and their families, and of Congress that 
the health of Gulf War veterans might have been affected by 
exposure to a wide variety of environmental hazards during the 
war, Congress passed two statutes, Public Law 105-277 and Public 
Law 105-368.26 These statutes were drawn directly from the Agent 
Orange Act of 1991 and established the now-familiar formal NAS 
process, which mandates regular and thorough reviews of the 
scientific and medical literature relevant to health and Gulf War 
                                                          
26 Persian Gulf War Veterans Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 
2681 (1998); Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
368, 112 Stat. 3315 (1998). 
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exposures. 
Major differences in the environmental exposures experienced 
by individuals serving during the Vietnam and Gulf Wars led to 
immediate problems with this approach. In contrast to the narrow 
range of exposures composed of “herbicides used in Vietnam and 
their dioxin contaminant,” the exposures related to service in the 
Gulf War involved dozens of different and unrelated 
environmental hazards. In fact, the two new statutes specified 
thirty-three Gulf War-related environmental and occupational 
hazards as well as broad categories of hazards to be evaluated 
through this process. Consequently, although the NAS has 
produced three major biannual reports, it has yet to complete even 
an initial review of all of the statutorily defined Gulf War 
hazards.27 
In addition, in 1991, there was only a limited amount of 
scientific literature on health effects of dioxins and Vietnam-
related herbicides for the NAS to review. In contrast, virtually all 
of the Gulf War hazards were well known and characterized, with 
an abundant health effects literature. The NAS reviews have thus 
failed to produce any new insights into the health effects of 
exposure to these hazards, as the NAS’s findings have mirrored 
those found in any standard occupational health and toxicology 
textbook. 
The first NAS report, completed in 2000, reviewed health 
effects from exposure to sarin, depleted uranium, pyridostigmine 
bromide, and certain vaccines, including the anthrax vaccine.28 The 
second report, completed in 2003, reviewed the health effects of 
exposure to all of the insecticides and solvents used in the 1991 
                                                          
27 INST. OF MEDICINE, NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, GULF WAR AND 
HEALTH VOL. 1: DEPLETED URANIUM, PYRIDOSTIGMINE BROMIDE, SARIN, 
VACCINES (2000) (Nat’l Academy Press, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter GULF 
WAR AND HEALTH VOL. 1] (on file with author); INST. OF MEDICINE, NAT’L 
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, GULF WAR AND HEALTH VOL. 2: INSECTICIDES AND 
SOLVENTS (2003) (Nat’l Academy Press, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter GULF 
WAR AND HEALTH VOL. 2] (on file with author); INST. OF MEDICINE, NAT’L 
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, GULF WAR AND HEALTH VOL. 3: FUELS, COMBUSTION 
PRODUCTS, AND PROPELLANTS (2004) (Nat’l Academy Press, Washington, D.C.) 
[hereinafter GULF WAR AND HEALTH VOL. 3] (on file with author). 
28 GULF WAR AND HEALTH VOL. 1, supra note 27, at 2. 
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Gulf War.29 The third report, completed in 2004, reviewed the 
health effects of exposure to oil well fire air pollutants and certain 
other chemicals associated with the 1991 Gulf War.30 
Taken together, these recent NAS reports contain dozens of 
somewhat predictable findings on health effects for dozens of 
hazardous agents. As with the Agent Orange Act of 1991, the new 
statutes direct the VA to find a positive association between a Gulf 
War hazard and a specific illness “if the credible evidence for the 
association is equal to or outweighs the credible evidence against 
the association,”31 or to provide to Congress a report including “the 
Secretary’s recommendations as to whether there is sufficient 
evidence to warrant a presumption of service-connection for the 
occurrence of a specified condition in Gulf War veterans.”32 When 
the evidence supports an association with a particular disease more 
than it does not, the statute requires the VA to develop regulations 
defining a presumptive service connection for that disease among 
Gulf War veterans.33 
C. Policy Problems 
The VA has had difficulty applying the NAS findings to Gulf 
War veterans because nearly all of the reviewed Gulf War-related 
                                                          
29 GULF WAR AND HEALTH VOL. 2, supra note 27, at 2. 
30 GULF WAR AND HEALTH VOL. 3, supra note 27 (forthcoming 
publication). 
31 Persian Gulf War Veterans Act of 1998 § 1602(b)(3), 112 Stat. 2681 
(1998) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 1118). 
32 Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1998 § 101(i)(2), 112 Stat. 3315 
(1998). 
33 Persian Gulf War Veterans Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 
1602(c)(1), 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 1118) (“Not later than 
60 days after the date on which the Secretary receives a report from the National 
Academy of Sciences . . . the Secretary shall determine whether or not a 
presumption of service connection is warranted for each illness, if any, covered 
by the report.”); id. § 1602(c)(2) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 1118) (“If the 
Secretary determines under this subsection that a presumption of service 
connection is warranted, the Secretary shall, not later than 60 days after making 
the determination, issue proposed regulations setting forth the Secretary’s 
determination.”). 
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hazards represent common, well-characterized occupational 
exposures that are experienced by virtually all Americans. It may 
come as a surprise to learn that military environmental exposures 
generally closely mirror the environmental exposures experienced 
by all Americans. 
1. Considering Exposure Magnitude 
The VA has had particular difficulty applying the NAS’s 
conclusions based on studies of civilian workers with occupational 
exposures to the experience of deployed Gulf War veterans. 
Although essentially all health effects reported by the NAS are 
based on studies of workers with occupational exposures typically 
occurring over years, and indeed decades, deployments during the 
1991 Gulf War typically lasted about only three months. For 
example, in its 2002 report, the NAS documented a slight increase 
in risk for leukemia among chemical industry workers who have 
large occupational exposure to benzene. These findings do little to 
inform us about the potential increased risk of leukemia in the 
typical Gulf War soldier experiencing an unremarkable benzene 
exposure during the few months of deployment. 
On the other hand, there are certainly examples of Gulf War 
veterans with greater than everyday or commonplace benzene 
exposure, for example, veterans who regularly worked on vehicle 
maintenance. Those cases could involve benzene exposure at 
levels more comparable to the typical civilian occupational 
exposures that formed the bases of the studies reviewed by the 
NAS. 
Similarly, many NAS findings on long-term health effects 
among civilian workers are reported only in cases that involved an 
unusual exposure sufficiently large to cause immediate and serious 
health effects. For example, certain long-term health effects from 
common organophosphorus pesticides are well documented, but 
only as the result of an exposure large enough to cause severe and 
immediate initial poisoning, typically, an occupational exposure. 
Exposures that do not cause immediate and serious effects have not 
been associated with long-term effects. How should the VA apply 
these NAS findings to the vast majority of veterans who 
BROWN MACROED CORRECTED 060605.DOC 6/20/2005 7:07 PM 
610 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
experienced only unexceptional exposures to these agents? In fact, 
all Americans have experienced some small, but more or less 
continuous exposure to common organophosphorus pesticides or to 
benzene during their lifetimes. Still, these exposures are considered 
to have negligible health risk significance, given the small 
magnitude of the exposure. 
The problem for the VA is that the underlying statutes 
outlining this process eliminate the requirement for any “Evidence 
of Exposure Magnitude” that would be necessary for a direct 
service connection and offer little or no guidance for making 
distinctions based on exposure magnitude or duration. In effect, 
this creates the somewhat scientifically implausible result of 
treating all exposures as equally likely to lead to an associated 
long-term health effect. As a result, the VA could presumptively 
service connect all of the illnesses positively associated by the 
NAS with all of the associated Gulf War risk factors identified by 
the NAS, no matter how universal or trivial the exposure 
magnitude may have been for most or even all Gulf War veterans. 
For these reasons, the VA has thus far been unable to develop 
any new presumptive service connected disabilities for the wide 
range of hazardous occupational and environmental exposures 
associated with the 1991 Gulf War. Some of the NAS findings are 
still under review. 
2. Are New Presumptive Service Connection Polices Necessary? 
Any presumptive service connection compensation policy will 
bring certain negative consequences. Policymakers presumably 
have determined that the advantages outweigh the drawbacks. In 
this instance, it is not clear that new presumptive service 
connections are necessary to provide equitable compensation to 
Gulf War veterans for the environmental and occupational injuries 
they sustained during their service. 
Both short- and long-term health effects from most Gulf War 
hazardous exposures were generally very well characterized, even 
before that war began. That information, which is summarized in 
the NAS reviews, provides Gulf War veterans with a strong basis 
for pursuing disability compensation through the conventional 
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direct service connection route. The NAS reviews provide Gulf 
War veterans with ready access to scientific information to support 
the “Evidence of a Scientific Association” criterion. A Gulf War 
veteran would still be required to show “Evidence of Military 
Exposure” and “Evidence of Temporal Plausibility” to support a 
direct service connection claim. However, today many 
environmental hazards have been inexorably linked with service in 
the 1991 Gulf War. 
Perhaps the greatest obstacle for establishing a direct service 
connection would be providing “Evidence of Exposure 
Magnitude” that demonstrates that the veteran’s exposure was at 
least as likely as not to have been the cause of her disability. 
However, that is a commonplace and hardly insurmountable 
obstacle for veteran compensation claims in general. For example, 
in cases in which the NAS had documented long-term health 
effects marked by immediate and serious health effects at the time 
of exposure, a veteran’s military record or other lay evidence 
would likely be sufficient to support the veteran’s claim. Indeed, 
veterans might even prevail in cancer claims based on initial 
exposures that did not involve immediate and obvious effects by 
demonstrating, through the presentation of their specific military 
occupation and service records, that they experienced long-term 
moderate to high-level exposures that are generally associated with 
cancer in the relevant occupational health literature and that these 
exposures were “at least as likely as not” the cause of their cancer. 
Thus, the direct service connection route could cover most 
disability claims for illnesses that the NAS found to be associated 
with Gulf War environmental and occupational exposures. More 
simply, the conventional direct service connection process, based 
on a review of the identity of the exposure and information about 
its magnitude, would be sufficient to establish service connection 
when warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
The majority of veteran disability compensation claims for 
injuries related to environmental or occupational exposures are 
evaluated on the merits of the individual case through the direct 
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service connection process. New presumptive service connection 
policies inevitably bring unintended consequences, including a 
perceived or actual disparity in access to disability benefits for 
different groups of veterans, unanticipated costs, and scientifically 
implausible or untenable policies. 
Presumptive service connection policies may be useful for 
specific situations in which it is impractical for veterans to develop 
a direct service claim, for example, when a veteran is diagnosed 
with an illness of unclear or unknown cause within a short period 
following separation from military service. Nevertheless, before 
considering new presumptive service connections that offer certain 
veterans special presumptive service connection, the VA and 
congressional policymakers should first determine that the 
conventional direct service connection route is not adequate to the 
task. 
When a new presumptive service connection policy is 
determined to be necessary, it should be implemented in a manner 
that is considered fair and consistent with available science. In 
virtually all cases this requires the use of an independent scientific 
review body, such as the NAS, to ensure the credibility of the new 
policy and the perception by all parties that the policy is 
impartially based upon the best science. 
Experience has shown that presumptive service connection 
policies that eliminate consideration of the magnitude of exposure 
should be avoided because they run the likely risk of inadvertently 
extending eligibility to all veterans, regardless of how trivial or 
commonplace their exposures may have been. Some of these issues 
may require clarification by Congress in the form of legislative 
fixes for those portions of statutes that have led to unanticipated 
problems. 
 
